Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players' past decisions, in real life, reputations are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. Our results show that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputation are not taken into account by participants for orienting their choices. We also find that reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, we find that, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights on the characteristics of reputation and on the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners but also when knowing that they will be selected.
Introduction improve its products and services, even if only internally to mitigate abuse. In short, reputation systems create real-world value". Reputation systems are designed to mediate and facilitate the process of assessing reputations within specific communities (Dellarocas, 2011) , and they are built upon users' evaluations. (Dellarocas, 2012 ).
This kind of systems is pivotal to the establishment of online transactions among distant strangers characterized by asymmetric information, in which buyers have little or no information about the goods they are going to buy, as in electronic markets like eBay. In these systems, comments or feedbacks provided by previous users are essential to promote trust among parties, to overcome information asymmetries, and to minimize frauds (Diekman et al., 2014). However, in online reputation, evaluations are largely opaque in many ways. Sources are unknown, as well as their metrics, meaning that what someone rates as good can be below average for someone else, and this is especially true for ratings, like stars. Comments can be misleading too, or, even worse, fraudulent, because interested targets or their competitors can artificially manipulate reviews, and thus portray a very different situation (Matzat and Snjders, 2012) . In spite of that, individuals heavily rely on others' reputations and evaluations, even when these are ambiguous and non transparent, as stars in online reputation systems (like Tripadvisor). Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) examine book reviews on two online booksellers and investigate the effects of reviews on books sales. Their analysis shows that evaluations, both in the form of written reviews and average star rankings, have an effect on book sales, even if negative and positive reviews have asymmetric effects on consumers' behavior.
Reputation systems are used in a variety of different contexts, from philantropy to science (Masum, Tovey, 2011 ), but they all are based on ambiguous, anonymous and usually aggregated evaluations.
The aim of this work is to explore the extent to which opaque reputations in the form of stars might support cooperation in a strategic game. We consider both sides of evaluations, introducing reputation-based partner selection in two variants: weak and strong. Given our interest in understanding ambiguous reputations, pervasive in online environments, we choose to run web-based experiments using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). To avoid confounding factors related to online transactions (prices, goods, sellers' features), to measure individuals' cooperative attitudes we decide to use a standard one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (Nowak, 2006; Perc 4 & Szolnoki, 2010; Capraro, 2013; .
In order to single out the effects of evaluations and partner selection on individuals' behaviors, we designed three different studies. In the first experiment, we implemented a between-subjects design in order to understand how ambiguous evaluations (in the form of a grade obtained in a previous non-specified test) are taken into account, and how participants use such an ambiguous evaluation system when assessing their partners' behaviors. In the second and in the third study, we investigated the effect of knowing that one will be evaluated on one's own behavior, by increasing the consequences of being evaluated, ranging from none to the possibility of being selected for another round of the game by a third-party knowing only the person's reputation (see Methods for more details).
Our results provide evidence of the importance of reputation even when it is opaque. More specifically, we report four major results: (i) people cooperate much less with low-reputation partners than with medium or high reputation partners, even if they do not know how that reputation was acquired, (ii) when given the opportunity to select a partner knowing only his or her reputation, people tend to select partners with high reputation; (iii) individuals use their own behavior as a baseline for evaluation, disregarding absolute value of actions; (iv) knowing that they will be evaluated by their partner and that a third party will have the opportunity to select them as future partners has the effect to turn a substantial proportion of defectors into cooperators.
In sum, even when opaque and uncertain, reputation affects decision making: bad reputation works as a signal of anti-social behavior and, in combination with partner selection, promotes cooperative choices in digital environments.
Methods
We have conducted a series of three studies recruiting subjects through the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mason and Suri, 2014; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Rand, 2012) . We refer the reader to Table 1 for a summary of the three studies. Here we report the experimental design of each of the three studies. Full instructions are reported in the Appendix. Table 1 : Summary of our three experiments. We refer to the Methods section for more details and to the Appendix for full experimental instructions.
Study 1
In this study we were interested in exploring whether opaque reputation is taken into account when interacting with someone, and how people apply an ambiguous reputation system when assessing their partner's behavior. After entering their TurkID, participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions. In the baseline condition, participants were randomly matched to play a standard Prisoner's dilemma (PD). Specifically, each participant was given $0.10 and had to decide whether to keep it (i.e., defect) or give it to the other player (i.e., cooperate). In the latter case, the $0.10 would be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other player. After reading the instructions, participants were asked four general comprehension questions in random order. Participants failing any of the comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Those who answered all comprehension questions were directed to the 'decision screen', in which they could select either 'keep' or 'give', by means of appropriate buttons.
Participants in the low reputation condition played the same PD game as in the baseline condition, but, before making their choice, they were told that the person they were matched with had participated in a previous test (without receiving any information about the kind of test), in which he or she was rated 1 out of 5 stars. This information was initially presented in the 'instructions screen' and then made salient in the 'decision screen'. In reality, there was no previous test and, to compute the payoffs, we paired subjects at random. The neutral evaluation condition was similar to the low reputation condition, with the only difference that participants were told that they were matched with a person who was rated 3 out of 5 stars in a previous test. In the high reputation condition participants were told that they were matched with partners who was rated 5 out of 5 stars in a previous test.
Participants in the evaluated condition played the same PD as in the baseline condition, but, before making their choice, they were informed that their choice would be communicated to the other participant, who would be asked to rate it from 1 to 5 stars. This procedure was real, as cooperators were paired with participants in the evaluate cooperator condition below, and defectors were paired with participants in the evaluate defector condition below.
In the evaluate cooperator condition participants first played the PD and then were informed that their partner had cooperated. At this stage, players were given the opportunity to rate the other participant's action from 1 to 5 stars. Finally, the evaluate defector condition was similar to the evaluate cooperator condition, with the only difference that participants were required to rate the behavior of an opponent who defected.
Study 2
As it will be shown in the Results section, the average cooperation in the evaluated condition of Study 1 is statistically the same as the average cooperation in the baseline condition, suggesting that the opportunity of being evaluated does not affect participants' choices in one-shot PD games, when the resulting reputation has no real consequences. We designed Study 2 in order to understand why the reputation threat had had no effect on individuals' behaviors in Study 1. We introduced a light manipulation to the setting used in the previous study, in which we informed players that their decisions (to cooperate or to defect) would be communicated to the other player who could give a rating going from 1 to 5 stars. Here, participants were also told that ratings were collected with the purpose of creating a rank of Turkers among which to select players with the highest ranks for further 7 participation in a particularly rewarding task. To build a reputation we used the data collected in the evaluate cooperator and evaluate defector conditions of Study 1. Specifically, each cooperator in this condition was randomly assigned to a participant in the evaluate cooperator condition and was assigned the evaluation given by this particular participant. Similarly with defectors.
Study 3
As it will be shown in the Results section, the light increase in the consequences of the evaluation experimented in Study 2 does not lead to an increase in cooperative behavior. The aim of Study 3 is to test whether a stronger form of partner selection would increase cooperative choices. To this end,
we employed a two-stage game in order to test for differences in cooperation levels between the first and the second game. After entering their TurkID, participants were randomly assigned to either of two conditions. In the Random+Evaluated condition, the first stage consisted of a standard PD (as in the baseline condition in Study 1) played with a randomly selected partner. The following stage, instead, was divided in three parts: a game part, an evaluation part, and a selection part. In the game part, participants played another PD, neutrally framed, with a randomly selected person, denoted Person A, but they were told that the experimenter, in the next part of the stage (i.e., the evaluation part), will communicate their decision to another person, Person B (different from Person A), who was in charge of assigning participant's behavior a grade ranging from 1 to 5 stars.
Participants were also told that, in the third part (i.e., the selection part), another player (Person C) was given a list of 5 participants (including themselves), each characterized by a different grade, from which they could choose their partner for playing a PD. Participants were told that, in case they were selected by Person C, they would be playing another round of the PD with Person C. In reality, there was no other round. So, the total payoff of a participant was given by the sum of the payoffs obtained in the two PDs. Complete information about the three parts of Stage 2 was given all together at the beginning of the stage itself, and two comprehension questions (in addition to the four comprehension questions asked in Stage 1) were asked before participants were allowed to make their decision.
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The other treatment, Choose+Evaluated, was again in two stages. In the first stage, after reading the instructions of the PD, participants were told that they were grouped with other five participants, each of whom was characterized by a different number of stars obtained in a previous unspecified test. Participants were asked to select the participant with whom they wanted to play. In reality, this selection procedure was fictitious, and participants played with a randomly selected subject playing in the same condition, regardless of their selection. After the choices were made, participants enter the second stage, which was exactly the same as in the Choose+Evaluated condition.
Results
A total of 962 subjects, located in the US, passed the comprehension questions and participated in our three studies. This corresponds to about 59% of the total number of participants: about 41% of subjects failed the attention check, and were automatically excluded from the survey. This is in line with previous studies using similar strategic situations. For instance, Capraro, Jordan and Rand (2014) report 32% of subjects failing a very similar attention test. To avoid multiple observations from the same participant, each time we found a participant identified with the same IP address and/or the same TurkID, we kept only the first decision and eliminated the rest. As a consequence of this, the 962 participants that we analyze are distinct in all measurable variables.
Participants failing the comprehension questions in one study were allowed to participate in the subsequent studies.
The effect of partner's opaque reputation on cooperative behavior and 'high' (Rank sum test: Z = 0.05, p = 0.9601) reputation conditions. Thus, low reputation is a signal of anti-sociality, but high reputation is not a signal of pro-sociality. Data show that, in these cases, the evaluator was herself a defector. In other words, the maximum grade given to a defector by a cooperator was 3 stars. This means that evaluations were conditional on one's own behavior, and not based on the absolute positive or negative value of participants' choices. Cooperators received very positive evaluations, in contrast with defectors' grades.
The effect of being evaluated and external partner selection on cooperation
Next, we analyze the effect of being evaluated on cooperative behavior in two cases: when the evaluation phase is not followed by real partner selection; and when it is followed by external partner selection, that is, by the possibility of being selected by the experimenter for new studies. Finally, we investigated people's preferences when they had the opportunity to choose a partner for playing the first PD (i.e., in the choose+evaluated condition). We find that the majority of people, but not all (75%), preferred to play with a partner with 5 stars. Those who decided to play with an opponent with less than 5 stars were significantly less cooperative than those who decided to play with an opponent with 5 stars (average cooperation: 35% vs 63%, Rank sum, p = 0.022).
Discussion
In this experimental work, we focused on the role of evaluations on cooperative behaviors, disentangling the effects of evaluating others from those of being evaluated, and assessing the relative We tested whether a reputation, low, neutral or high, coming from a completely unknown source and acquired in an obscure situation (i.e., what we termed opaque reputation) was used in a webbased experiment by participants who had to decide whether to cooperate or defect in a one-shot Prisoner Dilemma. Cooperation rates are affected by partners' rankings (expressed as one, three or five stars out of five), but this effect is not symmetrical. Participants rated with one star received significantly less cooperation than participants with neutral (three stars) and high (five stars) reputations.
The preminence of bad evaluations over good ones is a distinguishing trait of human psychology In the second study, participants were told that their actions would have been evaluated using the same opaque reputation system used in the first study, but our results showed that evaluation alone, without any actual partner selection, was not effective in increasing cooperative choices. Informing participants that their partners had the opportunity to rate them did not make cooperation increase with respect to a baseline, not even when we told them that a general ranking of players with the possibility of participating in future rewarding tasks would be created. This result allows us to narrow down the effect of partner selection, while stressing the fact that cooperation is not enhanced by the simple awareness that someone evaluates us.
In order to understand better how and under which conditions partner selection is effective in promoting cooperation, we design a third study using a repeated game in which participants were told that partner selection was real. Our results show an increase in cooperation levels between the first game (without evaluation and partner selection) and the second one, in which players were told that their behavior would have been evaluated and this evaluation transmitted to another potential player. The increase in cooperation was not due to 'active partner choice', because it happened also when partners were randomly assigned, therefore leading us to conclude that the combination 15 of being evaluated and being selected explained the observed increase in cooperation. In the third experiment, we also observed that a subset of participants selected partners with less than five stars and did not cooperate with them.
Although centered on digital reputation, our work adds to the literature on reputation systems More generally, our experiments provide insights on the way in which humans use reputational information in uncertain environments, like for instance in online interactions. This has implications that exceed online markets and can be applied to several domains. For example, companies or universities, whose success is highly based on cooperation among their employees, might develop a reputational system, according to which colleagues that have been working together on the same project can rate one another.
Our experiments certainly have some limitations. Study 1 uses deception in three out of seven conditions; specifically, those in which participants are told that their partners obtained a certain grade in a previous unspecified test. In reality there was no previous test. Study 3 uses deception when subjects are told that they could be selected for another round of the PD, depending on how their choice would be evaluated by a third party. In reality, although the evaluation procedure was real, there was no selection for other rounds. In general, the use of deceptive messages leads to a decrease of the effect size (when there is a true effect), driven by a proportion of subjects that may anticipate the fact that the manipulation is not real. Thus, the effect sizes that we found in Study 1 and Study 3 are likely to be a lower bound for the true effect sizes. Understanding the true sizes of these effects is an important direction for future work. On the other hand, it is possible that the asymmetric effect of reputation information on cooperative behavior (Study 1) is an artifact of the use of deceptive messages: participants paired with high reputation partners may be more skeptical about the reality of the manipulation than those paired with low reputation partners. Although, as discussed above, this asymmetry is in line with previous studies, we cannot exclude that, in our case, it is driven by the use of deception and thus we leave this question for further research.
A Experimental instructions
Each study started with the same two screens. In the first screen we asked participants to type their WorkID, while in the second screen we informed them about the average length of the study, the corresponding participation fee, and the fact that there would be comprehension questions. They were also informed that they would be automatically excluded from the survey in case they fail any of them. At the end of this screen, participants could either continue and play, or end the survey.
After each treatment, standard demographic questions were asked, at the end of which participants were given the completion code needed to claim for the payment. We report below full instructions of each study.
Study 1
In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to play one of six conditions (Baseline, Low reputation, Neutral reputation, High reputation, Evaluate cooperator, and Evaluate defector). Instructions of these conditions were as follows (we report the comprehension questions only in the Baseline condition, but they were present in each condition).
Baseline
You have been paired with another, anonymous participant. How much money you earn depends on your own choice, and on the choice of the other participant. You are given 10 additional cents.
You can either keep the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant. The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn nothing
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• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get 30 cents.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision. Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will ever be able to affect each others' bonuses in later parts of the HIT. Now we will ask you several questions to make sure that you understand how the payoffs are determined.
YOU MUST ANSWER ALL THESE QUESTIONS CORRECTLY TO RECEIVE A BONUS!
Which action by YOU gives YOU a higher bonus?
• Keep
• Give
Which action by YOU gives the OTHER PLAYER a higher bonus?
Which action by the OTHER PLAYER gives the OTHER PLAYER a higher bonus?
Which action by the OTHER PLAYER gives YOU a higher bonus?
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension questions. It is now time to make a decision.
WHAT IS YOUR CHOICE?
• Give
Low reputation
You have been paired with another participant. The other participant is not completely anonymous. In a previous study, he or she participated in a test. We will tell you how he or she was rated in this test later. You are now paired with this person and you both have to make a choice. How much money you earn depends on your own choice, and on the choice of the other participant. You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision. Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will ever be able to affect each others' bonuses in later parts of the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
YOU HAVE BEEN PAIRED WITH A PARTICIPANT RATED 1 STAR OUT OF A MAXI-MUM OF 5.
What is your choice?
• Keep 
Evaluate cooperator
WHAT IS YOUR CHOICE?
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The other participant decided to GIVE. Please rate his or her behavior.
• 1 star
• 2 stars
• 3 stars
• 4 stars
• 5 stars
Evaluate defector
This condition was identical to the EvaluateC condition, except for the fact that the partner decided to keep, therefore the word 'GIVE' in the last screen was replaced by 'KEEP'.
Study 2
In Study 2 participants were randomly selected to participate in either of two conditions: weak priming and strong priming. Below we report exact instructions of the treatment. Comprehension questions were exactly the same as in Study 1, so we do not report them again.
Weak priming
You have been paired with another, anonymous participant. How much money you earn depends on your own choice, and on the choice of the other participant. IMPORTANT: AFTER YOU MAKE YOUR CHOICE, WE WILL COMMUNICATE IT TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANT, WHO WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RATE YOUR BEHAVIOUR GIVING 1 TO 5 STARS.
You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant. The other participant will be given the same choice.
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REMEMBER THAT, AFTER THE CHOICES ARE MADE, THE OTHER PARTICIPANT WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RATE YOUR BEHAVIOUR.
• Give
Strong priming
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents What is you choice?
Study 3
In Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to either of two conditions: Random+Evaluated and Choose+evaluated. Full instructions are reported below. Comprehension questions about the Prisoner's Dilemma were exactly the same as in the previous studies and so we do not report them again.
Random+Evaluated
This HIT is divided in two stages.
In this first stage, you are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep it or give it to the other participant. If you decide to give it, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant. The other participant will be given the same choice.
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The other participant is REAL and will really make a choice. This is a one-shot interaction. In the second stage of this HIT you will be grouped with other participants. The current participant will not have the possibility to influence your bonus in later parts of the HIT.
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension questions. It is now time to make a choice.
What do you want to do?
• Give
The second stage of this HIT consists of three parts:
Here you will play the same game as in the first stage, with a random participant. You know nothing about him or her. Recall, briefly, the rules of the game: You are given 10 additional cents.
You can either keep it or give it to the other participant. If you decide to give it, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant. The other participant is given the same choice.
PART 2
Here we will communicate your choice to another participant, Person B (different from Person A). The role of Person B is to rate your choice by giving it a score ranging from 1 to 5 stars. you, you will play again and you will have the opportunity to win more money. Otherwise, if Person C chooses to play with someone else, your HIT will end. Now we will ask you two simple comprehension questions in order to make sure you understood the procedure. Recall that you must answer these questions correctly in order to get a bonus.
What happens in Part 2?
• I will play the same game again
• The choice I made in Part 1 will be communicated to a third-party, who will rate it
• The choice I made in Part 1 will be communicated to the same person with whom I played in Part 1, who will rate it
• The choice I made in Part 1 will be communicated to the same person with whom I played in Part 1, after which he or she makes his or her choice.
What happens in Part 3?
• I will play the same game with a person who knows the choice I made in Part 1
• I will play the same game with a person who knows how the choice I made in Part 1 was rated in Part 2
• I will be grouped with a person who knows how my choice was rated and decides whether to play with me or not.
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension questions.
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Choose+evaluated
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension questions. You have been grouped together with other five participants. In a previous HIT, these people participated in a test. They rated as follows:
• Person A's grade is 1 starout of a maximum of 5
• Person B's grade is 2starsout of a maximum of 5
• Person C's grade is 3starsout of a maximum of 5
• Person D's grade is 4starsout of a maximum of 5
• Person E's grade is 5starsout of a maximum of 5
Please choose the participant you would like to play with:
• Person A (grade: 1 star out of a maximum of 5)
